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Abstract
We realize shamir’s no-key protocol via quantum computation of Boolean
permutation and private quantum channel. The quantum no-key (QNK)
protocol presented here is one with mutual authentications, and proved to
be unconditionally secure. An important property of this protocol is that0
its authentication key can be reused permanently.
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1. Introduction
No-key protocol was first proposed by Shamir [1] which can be used to
transmit classical messages secretly in public channel without public key or
secret key. Shamir’s protocol is based on discrete logarithm problem which
cannot resist a man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack. The quantum version of
no-key protocol based on single-photon rotations was developed in [2, 3].
The security of quantum no-key (QNK) protocol is based on the laws of
quantum mechanics, rather than computational hypothesis. Other similar
protocols were proposed [4–6]. A protocol proposed in [7] with inherent
identification is based on quantum computing of Boolean functions which can
prevent MIM attack. Ref. [8] proposed a practical quantum no-key protocol
∗Corresponding author email: yangli@iie.ac.cn
with mutual identification, and present a newly attack named unbalance-of-
information-source (UIS) attack. A 9-round QNK protocol with data origin
authentication which achieves perfect security was constructed in [9]. Ref.
[10, 11] are quantum message oriented protocols which is the development of
Shannon’s one-time-pad encryption scheme in classical cryptography. Ref.
[12] presents some development of those quantum one-time pad schemes. In
this paper, we propose a QNK protocol based on the algorithm presented in
[10, 11]
2. Quantum no-key scheme with interactive identification
2.1. Private quantum channel
Ambainis et al. [11] defined PQC with an ancillary quantum state. Sup-
pose Uk, k = 1, 2, · · · , N is a set of operations. Each element Uk is a 2
n × 2n
unitary matrix. Let the plaintext state be a n-qubit quantum message ρ. In
the encryption stage, Uk is applied to the quantum state, where k is a secret
key. pk represents the probability of choosing k as secret key.
ρc = UkρU
†
k . (1)
To decrypt ciphertext, U †k is applied to ρc,
ρ = U †kρcUk. (2)
Quantum perfect encryption is defined in [11]: for every input state ρ, the
output state is an ultimately mixed state, that is
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k =
I
2n
. (3)
[11] constructs one perfect encryption by choosing pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αZβ(α, β ∈
{0, 1}n). Boykin and Roychowdhury prove that their construction is perfect.
2.2. Scheme description
Alice and Bob preshare bit strings s and r, s ∈ {0, 1}n, r ∈ {0, 1}
n
2 . Alice
intends to transmit classical message x to Bob through quantum channel.
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1. Alice randomly selects αA, βA ∈ {0, 1}
n to encrypt |x〉I〈x| with Y
αAHβA:
Y αAHβA|x〉I〈x|H
βAY αA =
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m|, (4)
The first register represents the encrytpion of plaintext.
Then Alice does unitary transform Us on the quantum state:
Us
(∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |0〉II〈0|
)
U †s
=
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)〉II〈Fs(m)|, (5)
and uses r and a randomly selected bit string rA ∈ {0, 1}
n
2 to do
exclusive-or operation to get:
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA|. (6)
The second register consists of the identity information about Alice.
Finally Alice sends Bob registers I, II.
2. Bob uses preshared s to do the computation:
U−1s (
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA|)(U
−1
s )
†
=
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m)⊕ Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA|
=
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |r‖rA〉II〈r‖rA|, (7)
then Bob measures the second register to get the string r‖rA, if the
first n
2
bits are identical with r, he accepts that the message comes
from Alice; otherwise, he aborts the scheme.
Through verification, Bob randomly selects αB, βB ∈ {0, 1}
n, and uses
Y αBHβB to encrypt:
Y αBHβB(
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m|)H
βBY αB =
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m|. (8)
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The first register contains the transmitted plaintext, and Bob will uses
the third register to add his identity information.
Bob does transform Us:
Us(
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |0〉III〈0|)U
†
s
=
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)〉III〈Fs(m)|, (9)
and uses rA and a randomly selected rB to do exclusive-or operation,
the quantum state becomes:
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB〉III〈Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB|. (10)
then sends Alice registers I, III.
3. Alice uses s to disentangle the registers:
U−1s (
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB〉III〈Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB|)(U
−1
s )
†
=
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |rA‖rB〉III〈rA‖rB|. (11)
Afterwards Alice measures the third register, if first part of the result of
measurement is equal to rA, she accepts the legality of Bob; otherwise,
the scheme is aborted.
Through verification, Alice decrypts with HβAY αA:
HβAY αA(
∑
m
α
′
m|m〉I〈m|)Y
αAHβA =
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m|, (12)
and uses s to do transform Us as well as r, rB to do exclusive-or oper-
ation:
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |0〉IV 〈0|
→
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC〉IV 〈Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC |, (13)
then sends Bob registers I, IV .
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4. Bob uses s to do U−1s transform to disentangle the registers:
U−1s (
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC〉IV 〈Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC |)(U
−1
s )
†
=
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |rB‖rC〉IV 〈rB‖rC |. (14)
By measuring register IV , Bob can verify the legitimacy of Alice. He
retains rC to replace r. So the preshared bit strings between Alice and
Bob for the next session are s and rC .
If Bob makes sure that the message sender is Alice, he decrypts with
HβBY αB :
HβBY αB(
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m|)Y
αBHβB = |x〉I〈x|, (15)
finally Bob gets the transmitted message x.
3. Security analysis
In the first round communication, if the adversary intercept the trans-
mitted message in the quantum channel, the message state for him is:
σ1 =
∑
m,s,r,rA
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA|. (16)
For every given input m, Fs(m) iterates through all the possible value. So the
quantum state
∑
s,r,rA
|Fs(m) ⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m) ⊕ r‖rA| is an ultimately mixed
state which has nothing to do with the value of m. Part of the ciphertext
state:
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| is obtained by performing H and Y on the plaintext
state. Now, we firstly prove that the following proposition.
Proposition 1. {pk =
1
22n
, Uk = U
α
1
Uβ
2
, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a
quantum perfect encryption.
Proof: Since {Uα
1
Uβ
2
, α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a complete orthonormal basis,
any n-qubit state ρ can be represented as a linear combination of these 22n
unitary matrixes:
ρ =
∑
α,β
aα,βU
α
1
Uβ
2
,
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where aα,β = tr(ρU
β
2
Uα
1
)/2n.
Thus,
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k =
1
22n
∑
γ,δ
Uγ
1
U δ
2
ρU δ
2
Uγ
1
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
Uγ
1
U δ
2
Uα
1
Uβ
2
U δ
2
Uγ
1
.
From U1U2 = −U2U1,we have U
δ
2
Uα
1
= (−1)α·δUα
1
U δ
2
. Thus, the above for-
mula can be expressed as:
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δUα
1
Uγ
1
U δ
2
(−1)β·γU δ
2
Uγ
1
Uβ
2
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δ(−1)β·γUα
1
Uβ
2
.
Because 1
2n
∑
γ∈{0,1}n(−1)
β·γ = δβ,0, the above formula is equal to:
∑
α,β
aα,βδα,0δβ,0U
α
1
Uβ
2
= a00I =
tr(ρ)
2n
I =
I
2n
.
So, it is a quantum perfect encryption.
Similarly, it’s easy to prove that {pk =
1
22n
, Uk = Y
αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈
{0, 1}n} also forms a PQC. So
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| is an ultimately mixed state.
Thus, the message state σ1 for the adversary is:
σ1 =
∑
m
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗
∑
s,r,rA
|Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA|
=
I
2n
⊗
I
2n
=
I
22n
. (17)
Since σ1 is an ultimately mixed state, the adversary cannot acquire anything
by measuring it.
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In the second round of communication, the transmitted message state
becomes:
σ2 =
∑
m,s,rA,rB
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB〉III〈Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB| (18)
Supposed that the adversary is able to intercept it, the quantum state for
him is also an ultimately mixed state:
σ2 =
I
22n
. (19)
Similarly, in the third round, the transmitted message state is also an
ultimately mixed state:
σ3 =
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC〉IV 〈Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC |
=
I
22n
. (20)
Above analysis shows that the preshard s, r and secret information x will
not be disclosed to the attacker. MIM attack is not effective in this protocol.
The adversary has no useful method to attack.
Remark 1. There are many special cases satisfying the conditions of U1 and
U2, such as X and Z, X and Y , Y and H , X and H . Thus, the following
examples are all quantum perfect encryptions.
1. PQC1:{pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αZβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
2. PQC2:{pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αY β , k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
3. PQC3:{pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
4. PQC4:{pk =
1
22n
, Uk = Y
αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
1. When we choose the PQC1: {pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αZβ, α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}
for QNK protocol, it is insecure to transmit classical information. Be-
cause X operation is to reverse the bit and the function of Z oper-
ation is to shift the phase. Thus the attacker can measure the ci-
phertext state in the basis {|0〉, |1〉} without breaking it. And be-
cause the three ciphertext transmitted between Alice and Bob are
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XαAZβA|m〉, XαBZβBXαAZβA|m〉,XαBZβB |m〉, the attacker can ac-
quire three strings αA ⊕ m,αB ⊕ αA ⊕ m,αB ⊕ m by measuring the
three ciphertext. The attacker can computes αB with the first string
and the second string. Then he can computes the message m with the
value of αB and the third string.
2. When choosing the PQC2: {pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αY β, α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}
for the quantum no-key protocol, it is also unsafe to transmit classical
information for the same reason. In this case, the three ciphers trans-
mitted between Alice and Bob is XαAY βA|m〉,XαBY βBXαAY βA|m〉,
XαBY βB |m〉, measuring the three ciphers can achieve the three strings
αA⊕ βA⊕m,αB ⊕ βB ⊕αA⊕ βA⊕m,αB ⊕ βB ⊕m. The attacker can
computes αB ⊕βB with the first string and the second string. Then he
can computes the message m with the value of αB ⊕ βB and the third
string.
3. In PQC3:{pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}, X and Y
do not satisfy the condition that X and Y should form an orthonormal
basis.
4. By using Y αHβ in the protocol, the message is being encoded into
the conjugate coding, and the flaw stated in the above disappears. If
using POC1 and POC2, after the classical bits being encoded into
computational basis state, it will stay in computational basis state
during the exchange in the protocol. It is better to choose the PQC4:
{pk =
1
22n
, Uk = Y
αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} for the quantum
no-key protocol.
Next, we take another attack into account. Assume that the adversary
intercepts all the transmitted ciphertext during one session between Alice and
Bob. The transmitted ciphertext during the three rounds of communication
are:
σ1 =
∑
m,s,r,rA
αm|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA〉II〈Fs(m)⊕ r‖rA|,
σ2 =
∑
m,s,rA,rB
α
′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB〉III〈Fs(m)⊕ rA‖rB|,
σ3 =
∑
m
α
′′
m|m〉I〈m| ⊗ |Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC〉IV 〈Fs(m)⊕ rB‖rC|.
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The whole quantum state from adversary’s viewpoint is:
∑
m1,m2,m3
∑
s,r,rA,rB,,rC
αm1α
′
m2
α
′′
m3
|m1, m2, m3〉I〈m1, m2, m3|
⊗|Fs(m1)⊕ r‖rAFs(m2)⊕ rA‖rB, Fs(m3)⊕ rB‖rC〉II ×
×II〈Fs(m1)⊕ r‖rA, Fs(m2)⊕ rA‖rB, Fs(m3)⊕ rB‖rC |. (21)
In [9] , the conclusion is that the authentication key cannot be used forever
in the QNK protocol with 3 rounds or less than 3 rounds of communication.
If we consider the trace distance between the direct product of any two
ciphertext among the three transmitted ciphertext in the proposed QNK
protocol in Section 2, we cannot have the result that such trace distance
is zero for different plaintext and authentication keys s, r. As a result, we
cannot prove the permanent use of authentication keys s, r. Guaranteed
by the no-cloning theorem, the adversary is unable to copy the unknown
quantum state transmitted in the channel. The participants involved in
the communication process send message with identification. The message
without identity information is not send out into the channel. All the three
ciphertext cannot be possessed by the adversary at the same time. So, the
coefficients αm1 , α
′
m2
, α
′′
m3
are distributed in different time and space. The
product of αm1 , α
′
m2
, α
′′
m3
is zero. Thus, it’s no use in computing the trace
distance between the direct product of any two ciphertext among the three
transmitted ciphertext. Moreover, it’s also no used in demonstrating that
the quantum state show in formula 21 is an ultimately mixed state.
4. Discussion
QNK protocol cannot resist MIM attack without identification. The QNK
protocol based on PQC without identification is as bellow:
1. Alice encrypts ρ with Y αAHβA, and sends Bob ρ1 = Y
αAHβAρHβAY αA .
2. Bob encrypts ρ1 with Y
αBHβB and sends Alice ρ2 = Y
αBHβBρ1H
βBY αB .
3. Alice decrypts ρ2 withH
βAY αA and sends Bob ρ3 = H
βAY αAρ2Y
αAHβA.
4. Bob decrypts ρ3 with H
βBY αB to recover ρ.
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If attacker Eve intercepts the message ρ1 from Alice, he randomly selects
bit strings αE and βE to encrypt ρ1 and sends Alice ρ
′
2
= Y αEHβEρ1H
βEY αE .
Alices decrypts ρ
′
2
withHβAY αA and sends Eve ρ
′
3
= HβAY αAρ
′
2
Y αAHβA. Eve
receives ρ
′
3
and decrypts it with HβEY αE . Finally, Eve can get message ρ
successfully.
In section 2, we add identification into the protocol to resist MIM attack.
Preshard information r and s are necessary in identifying the communicators,
so the privacy of r and s are important. We use local random string rA, rB,
Boolean permutation Fs(·) and quantum entanglement to protect the Alice
and Bob’s preshared bit strings r and s.
Since the plaintext is encrypted by quantum perfect encyrtion transfro-
mation, the ciphertext state is an ultimately mixed which has nothing to do
with the plaintext. In the protocol descryption, we take classical message
as example. Moreover, the QNK protocol with identificaiton can be used to
transmit quantum message.
5. Conclusions
Quantum no-key encryption protocols are presented based on quantum
perfect encryption. We make use of random bit strings, Boolean permutation
and the property of entanglement to ensure protocols’ security. This protocol
with identification can resist MIM attack. The security analysis shows that
the pieces of ciphertext of the three rounds are all ultimately mixed states,
and the authentication keys can be reused permanently.
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